A governor extended a public-health emergency order beyond the period specified in the enabling statute without obtaining legislative approval. At first glance, the underlying health threat had not fully ended. But the constitutional court identified the decisive question as whether the unilateral extension exceeded the statute's temporal limit. It explained that the executive may issue an initial emergency order for thirty days and may renew it only with approval of the legislative emergency committee; general language authorizing necessary measures does not erase that express renewal condition. Because the initial order lasted thirty days, the committee declined to approve renewal, and the governor extended the same restrictions for another twenty days based solely on general necessity language, the constitutional court reasoned that the specific committee-approval condition controlled renewal despite the general grant of necessary-measures authority. That analysis led it to reject the claim that broad emergency-purpose language lets the executive disregard every procedural limit; the constitutional court then invalidated the extension after day thirty while leaving actions taken during the initial period undisturbed.